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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 01/08/2006 Accident number: 430 
Accident time: 10:30 Accident Date: 20/02/2001 
Where it occurred: 4km N.W. Omhajer 
Village, Gash Barka 
Country: Eritrea 
Primary cause: Unavoidable Secondary cause: Management control 
inadequacy 
Class: Survey accident Date of main report: 27/02/2001 
ID original source: [Name removed] Name of source: [Name removed] 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AT blast Ground condition: Unsurfaced road 
Date record created: 01/08/2006 Date  last modified: 01/08/2006 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 4 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR CA 423 901 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
Inadequate medical provision (?) 
Inadequate communications (?) 




A Board of Inquiry report from the UNMEE Mine Action Coordination Centre was made 
available in 2004. It is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.  
 
27 February 2001 





A. Map. Russian Military Topographic Series. Sheet 62.  
B. MACC Draft Technical and Safety Standards Dated February 2001. 
C. [Demining group] SOPs for dangerous area surveys. 
 
REPORT OF BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO LANDMINE INCIDENT 20 FEBRUARY 2001 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. As a result of a landmine incident on 20 February 2001, a Board of Inquiry was convened 
by the UNMEE Mine Action Coordination Centre to conduct an investigation on behalf of the 
United Nations, in accordance with the requirements of the UNMEE MACC Standards. The 
initial report of the incident is shown at Annex A. 
2. At approximately 11:00hrs on 20 February, a left hand drive Land Rover with add-on 
armour for mine protection, crewed by a [Demining group] Survey Team struck a landmine. 
The vehicle’s front left wheel area and part of the engine were extensively damaged. There 
were no serious injuries. 
3. The incident involved a Survey Team from [Demining group]’s Asmara office, which was 
collecting information about a suspect area of ground as part of a wider survey in Sector 
West. 
4. The Board comprised: 
a. [Name removed] Chief of Operations UNMEE MACC- Chairman. 
b. [Name removed] Chief of Information UNMEE MACC -Member of the board. 
c. Name removed], representing [Demining group] was present throughout the Board of 
Inquiry investigation including all interviews. 
5. A copy of the Board's Terms of Reference is attached at Annex B. 
6. The Board of Inquiry team visited Omhajer on the day after the incident and interviewed all 
persons associated with the incident., with the exception of [Name excised] who was 
unavailable during the investigation visit. It was not possible to approach the wrecked vehicle 
due to the threat of landmines and so a helicopter was used to look down on the vehicle and 
area. Three circuits were made of the area during the flight into Omhajer and a further two 
circuits were made during the flight out of Omhajer. 
 
SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES OF TASKING 
7. The survey task that the personnel involved in this incident were involved in was part of a 
wider contract, funded by the US State Department for Survey activities in the TSZ. 
8. Sequence of tasking was directed by [Demining group] from Asmara. [Demining group] 
state that this area was selected because of the proximity of the local JORBAT Company site 
and that the task was also a continuation of earlier [Demining group] surveys in that area. 
Also, UNHCR had informed [Demining group] during a liaison visit by the team to UNHCR 
Tesseney that up to 30,000 refugees or IDPs would be expected to return to Omhajer area 
soon, probably from 15 March. 
9. [Demining group] also state that this survey was being carried out in the Omhajer area as 
an extension of a previous tasking from UNMEE MACC for work in Omhajer village. No 
tasking was requested from UNMEE MACC for any areas outside Omhajer village. No report 




10. The incident occurred near North West to of the village of Omhajer, in the South Western 
area of Gash Barka administrative zone, Grid Reference CA 423 901. 
11. The area where the incident occurred is rough terrain, generally flat or gently sloping. 
Grass and vegetation is very sparse, the area is currently almost barren but is ploughed in 
preparation for planting and some parts of the area are thinly covered with small trees and 
bushes. The ground was dry at the time of the incident. 
12. The Land Rover was travelling on an un-surfaced track that runs through the area; edges 
of the track are not well defined. The nearest main road is the Omhajer to Guluj route, 
approximately four kilometres away and this is also unsurfaced. The point where the mine 
detonated was on the track, directly beneath the front offside wheel. 
13. The nearest buildings are near close to the main road junction, passed by the team on the 
way to the survey area, approximately four kilometres away. The village of Omhajer is 
approximately four kilometres to the southeast of the incident site. 
14. There are lines of defensive trenches near to the area; the closest trench line is 
approximately 600 metres to the south from the point of detonation.  
15. A Demining Team from the Eritrean Defence Force had manually checked the track in an 
operation on the morning of the incident, from 0545hrs to 0745hrs. This checking was as a 
result of a request from [Demining group] on the evening before the incident. The EDF had 
checked this same route in September 2000 when they took over the area from withdrawing 
Ethiopian forces, and once more prior to thealso on approximately 26 January 2001. accident. 
16. Five other landmine incidents have occurred in the area during the last six months and 
these are recorded on the briefing map at the local UNMO Team Site. Details provided by the 
local UNMO Team Commander are shown at Annex C. The majority of these incidents have 
resulted in injuries to livestock. 
17. Photographs of the area are shown at Annex D. [One is reproduced below.] 
 
 
PRIORITY OF TASK  
18. The priority for this task was established directly by the in-country regional Project 
Manager of [Demining group], as part of their contract with the US Department of State for 
survey operations in the TSZ. No priority had been set for any mine clearance activities on the 
area. 
[Demining group] state that priority of this task was also driven by the fact that local armed 
forces are scheduled to depart the area by 26 February and it is therefore anticipated that no 
EDF guides, deminers or Liaison Officers will be available in Omhajer region after that date. 
 
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING 
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19. A map of the area of the incident is attached at Annex E. 
20. Because this was not an operational demining task site, there was no marking of any kind 
on the area. 
21. The extent and perimeters of minefields in the area are unknown; this is partly because no 
minefield records have been made available of this area and partly because no minefield 
survey has been completed in the area. Part of [Demining group]’s task on the day of the 
incident was to define the approximate boundaries of mined areas. 
22. Because the road where the incident occurred is not surfaced, the edges of the road are 
not specifically defined and it is likely that the line of the road moves from season to season. 
 
SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE 
23. [Demining group] deploys their teams as two-man units, it is stated that a driver and a 
translator normally supports them but there is no written SOP to support this. An EDF Liaison 
Officer and EDF Demining Engineers also accompanied the Survey Team on this and other 
occasions. 
24. One surveyor in the team is in charge of the task and as such is responsible for discipline 
and supervision of other team members. A request was made to [Demining group] Eritrea for 
a copy of their Survey SOPs, and one single page was provided to the UNMEE MACC in 
response to this request. No written SOP supports anything that occurs in the field and daily 
routines, procedures and methods of operation seem to be regulated verbally. 
25. The teams are largely independent and their work is driven by instructions originated at 
[Demining group]’s Asmara office. The teams’ work schedules are not submitted to any 
agency outside [Demining group]. 
26. After a survey of an area, [Demining group] Survey Teams routinely complete standard a 
combined [Demining group]/IMSMA report format reportsof the survey. These are filed at 
[Demining group] Asmara and a copy is provided to UNMEE MACC for entry into the UN 
IMSMA database and archived at the MACC. 
26. It is not known whether any other type of reporting is required or provided. 
 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
27. [Demining group] do not operate under any SOP known to UNMEE MACC, so it is not 
known how quality of work is regulated or whether there is any formal regime of supervision 
or inspection for the work of [Demining group]’s Survey Teams, the quality of their work is 
regulated by... it is unknown to the MACC how the quality of the work is regulated. 
28. [Demining group] Project Manager from Asmara or his deputy visit the Survey Teams in 
the field on a regular basis, approximately once each week. Further visits are sometimes 
carried out for training reasons or major tasking schedule changes or as part of EOD tasks 
implemented as a result of reports from the Survey Teams.  
29. A request to [Demining group]Asmara for a copy of [Demining group]’s Survey SOP 
elicited a document consisting of one single page, entitled ‘Succinct Survey SOPs’ and 
reported by [Demining group] to be ‘as used in Kosovo’. 
 
COMMUNICATIONS 
30. [Demining group]’s radio communications plan for this survey task was based on HF 
radios. The Survey Teams’ vehicles are each fitted with an HF radio as part of their routine 
equipment. On the day of the incident [The Victim] used his vehicle radio to inform [Demining 
group]’s Asmara office about the incident. At the same time, assistance was requested over 
the HF radio to the UNMO Team at Omhajer, four kilometres from the site of the incident. 
31. The UNMO Team at Omhajer man a twenty-four hour operations room equipped with a 
HF Base Station, VHF Base Station with a VHF repeater on the roof and a satellite telephone. 
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In addition, each of the UNMO vehicles is fitted with vehicle-mounted HF and VHF radios. 
Each UNMO team member is also equipped with a personal, hand-held VHF radio. No V-Sat 
telephone line is available at this time, but it is reported that this is planned for the future. 
32. The UNMO Team Commander provided copies of daily reports and radio logs for the day 
of the incident to the Board of Inquiry team. 
33. There is also a UN Jordanian company base at Omhajer, situated approximately 100 
metres from the UNMO Team Site. An HF radio on a table in the men’s sleeping quarters is 
manned twenty-four hours a day at this location, but there is no operations room. Each of the 
company vehicles is also fitted with VHF radios. 
34. The daily operations report for the Company was a hand written page and this was shown 
to the Board of Inquiry team. The Company Commander promised a photocopy would be 
handed to the team, but no copy was provided. 
35. No system of radio checks between the [Demining group] vehicles and the local UNMO or 
UNPK units was initiated or planned. 
It is possible that the VHF repeater at the Omhajer UNMO Team site may have afforded 
reliable communication between the [Demining group] team and the UNMO team site. This 
could have supported any assistance required to the [Demining group] team from the UNMO 
team in Omhajer. Although [Demining group] has VHF handheld radios, they were not present 
with the team in Omhajer. The repeater at the Omhajer UNMO Team site may have afforded 
reliable communication between the [Demining group] team and the UNMO team site. This 
could have aided in any assistance required to the [Demining group] team from the UNMO 
team in Omhajer. 
 
MEDICAL 
36. No serious injuries were sustained as a result of the mine incident. Team Leader, [the 
Victim] had bleeding from his ears and treatment was provided to him from the doctor at the 
Jordanian Company base at Omhajer. [The Voctim] was later brought to Asmara in a UNMEE 
helicopter and was subsequently examined and treated at the Jordanian Level II hospital. 
37. [Demining group] Survey Teams routinely carry first aid and medical equipment as part of 
their vehicle kit and a trauma kit was available in this case. No qualified medic (other than 
[name removed] said to be a paramedic) was on the site but all [Demining group] personnel 
are trained in first aid. [Demining group] is currently implementing a medic’s course and this 
will provide the requisite qualified personnel to join Survey Teams soon. 
38. No casualty evacuation plan was in place with the [Demining group] Survey Teams on the 
day of the incident. The nearest hospital in Eritrea is at Guluj, approximately forty minutes 
driving time from the scene of the incident. There is also a hospital in Humera, Ethiopia, 
approximately fifteen minutes driving time, but use of this facility is not guaranteed. 
39. The [Demining group] Team relied on support from UNMEE in the event of a serious 
accident to their team but had not coordinated this on the day of the incident. They expected 
that a UNMEE helicopter would be provided to give assistance to any casualty evacuation 
from the area. 
 
PERSONALITIES INVOLVED 
40. Personnel directly involved in the incident were five persons travelling together in an 
armoured Land Rover as part of a minefield Survey Team from [Demining group] Asmara, as 
detailed below. 
a. [Demining group] Team Leader [the Victim] Vehicle driver. 
b. EDF demining NCO [name removed] Right Front seat passenger. 
c. [Demining group] Translator [name removed] Left back seat passenger. 
d.  EDF Liaison Officer to UNMO [Name removed] Centre back seat passenger. 
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e. EDF demining NCO [Name removed] Right back seat passenger. 
 
41. A second Land Rover carrying five other personnel, uninvolved in the landmine detonation 
was following approximately twenty-five metres behind the damaged vehicle. 
42. Written statements from all members of the Survey Teams are shown at Annex F. 
 
EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS 
43. [Demining group] Land Rovers are comprehensively equipped with demining tools and 
equipment to sustain their operation in the field. In this case, no demining operations were 
being carried out and so all tools and equipment remained in the vehicle. 
44. After the landmine detonated, all personnel were accounted for and then all tools and 
equipment were removed from the damaged vehicle to be re-loaded onto the second vehicle. 
45. The Eritrean Armed Defence Forces demining detachment at Omhajer who cleared the 
track on the day of the incident are equipped with one Schiebel AN-19/2 metal detector 
between thirty-five personnel. This machine was not used during the track clearance. The 
track was cleared using lengths of 10mm diameter reinforcing rod used as prodders, each 
approximately one metre long, sharpened to a blunt point at one end and bent over in a crook 
at the other end to assist in carrying and deployment. 
 
DETAILS OF MINE INVOLVED 
46. It was not possible to positively confirm the type of mine involved in this incident during 
the course of the Board of Inquiry’s investigation because the clearance of ground necessary 
to view the crater and immediate area was hampered by the danger posed by the threat of 
other mines in the area. Although the Board of Inquiry Team did not visit the point of 
detonation, it is assessed that the mine involved in this incident was a probably an Anti Tank 
blast mine. This assessment is made because of the amount of damage sustained by the 
Land Rover and because of the size of the crater left behind.  
47. The effects of the detonation caused the Land Rover to be thrown around, away from the 
original direction of travel. See photographs at Annex D. 
48. It is unknown whether any records exist from Eritrea or Ethiopia about landmines laid in 
this area, but in view of the proximity of EDF EAF trench lines, it is likely that landmines were 
laid in the area to protect local defensive positions. This possibility is supported by the history 
of land mine incidents in the area, as shown at Annex C. 
49. UNMO Team Site Commander at Omhajer states that it is known that landmines are laid 
on the north side of the River Tekeze and in front of defensive positions formerly occupied by 
Ethiopian forces in the area where the [Demining group] Survey was to take place. 
50. There is considerable evidence that the area is mined; five incidents have occurred in the 
area since September 2000, as shown on the map at Annex E.  Advice routinely given by the 
Omhajer UNMO Team is that travelling in this area is not recommended due to the threat of 
landmines. 
51. [Demining group] Survey Team members state that local people had informed them that 
farm tractors use the unsurfaced track approximately once each week. EDF personnel also 
state that a farm tractor had travelled down the track on the day before the incident, prior to 
[Demining group] travelling there on the day of the incident. 
52. The Jordanian Company at Omhajer report that, due to the threat of landmines, they do 
not travel in the area where this detonation took place. 
 
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING 
53. Although there was no direct evidence or suspicion of re-mining at any part of this area, 
local Eritrean Defence Force personnel claim that the mine could have been laid during the 
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interval between the [Demining group]’s first transit of the road, towards their survey task, and 
the second, on their return journey. No reasons were put forward to support this theory, 
except for a general suspicion of enemy activity in the area, based on recent security 
incidents in south west Gash Barka region, as reported by UNMO Team Omhajer and shown 
at Annex C to this report. 
54. There are no known controversial returnees to the area but the ethnicity of the area is 
disputed by trans border extremists and Islamic groups. 
 
DRESS & PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
55. The Land Rover involved in this incident was armoured to a custom design by a specialist 
company in UK. The armour is designed to withstand the detonation of anti tank mine 
beneath the vehicle. 
56. The vehicle is a diesel engine, five-door ‘safari’ type Land Rover, designed to carry five 
passengers. The vehicle was fully laden including being fitted with a roof rack, which was also 
carrying equipment and stores. 
57. Members of the team who were questioned on the subject stated that they were wearing 
their seatbelts at the time of detonation. [Demining group] has a system of fines for 
employees who do not use their seatbelts while travelling in [Demining group] vehicles. 
Sufficient Personal Protective Equipment is carried in each [Demining group] Survey vehicle 
to provide for all Survey Team members. 
 
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON DAY OF INCIDENT 
58. The following account summarises the responses to questions by members of the Board, 
directed to personnel involved in the incident and to managers and supervisors at [Demining 
group] Asmara.  
59. The [Demining group] Survey teeam’s visit to the Omhajer region was pre-planned as part 
of their weekly work schedule. The team arrived in the area at about 1600hrs on the day 
before the incident, after having driven from Barentu, via the UNHCR at Tesseney, total 
journey time from Barentu was approximately five-and-a-half hour’s drive, including rest 
stops.  
60.  They received a briefing from the UNMO Team at Omhajer, where the UNMO Team 
deputy commander used a briefing map to point out the sites of previous landmine incidents 
to the [Demining group] Team. UNMO Team Commander also reports that [Demining group] 
were informed that travel along un-cleared roads and tracks in the sector was inadvisable 
until after 0900hrs each morning, but that the UNMO Team have no authority to prevent 
NGOs travelling where and when they want. [Demining group] were advised to speak also to 
the local EDF demining detachment, situated approximately two kilometres away from the 
UNMO Team Site.  
61. [Demining group] report that receipt of the information on recent incidents in the area from 
the UNMOs made them realise that they would have to be particularly careful during their 
survey operations on the next day, because they would be travelling within the vicinity of 
recent landmine incidents. The Team had assessed that they would be approximately 700 
metres away from the nearest front line trenches and therefore deduced that they would be 
outside any local protective minefields. 
62. An arrangement was made to visit the camp of the local EDF demining detachment at 
Omhajer on that afternoon. It was agreed at the meeting that [name removed] would arrange 
for his demining troops to clear the track that [Demining group] would be travelling on during 
the early morning next day. In the event, either eight or nine soldiers from the EDF Demining 
Team carried out this task between approximately 0545 and 0745hrs. 
63. After the meeting with EDF engineers, the [Demining group] team returned to the UNMO 
Team Site at Omhajer and then stood down until the next day.  
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64. On the day of the incident, [name removed] and his deputy, [name removed] were 
collected by [Demining group] from the EDF Demining Team camp and driven to the UNMO 
Team Site to join the [Demining group] Survey Team. Preparations were made for the day’s 
activities and the team departed the area at some time between 0815hrs and 0830hrs. 
65. When the team departed the area they were in possession of the HF frequencies, call 
signs and selective call numbers of the UNMO Team site. However, the [Demining group] 
Survey Team did not provide similar information about their communications to the UNMO 
team. 
66. Both [Demining group] Survey Teams and the EDF NCOs, accompanied by the EDF 
Liaison Officer drove together in the two Land Rovers, north out of Omhajer. After 
approximately two kilometres they turned left off the road onto the unsurfaced track towards 
the area of the former Ethiopian front lines, a known mined area. 
67. While the Survey Team were travelling along the unsurfaced track towards the area of 
their Survey Task, they saw the local EDF Demining Team, at approximately five kilometres 
from the main Omhajer to Guluj road, who by this time had finished their clearance of the 
track. 
68. The Survey Teams drove along the track in convoy for approximately five kilometres. 
They then disembarked their vehicles; the surveyors carried out some compass and GPS 
resections over the area and made assessments on the local landmine threat.  
69. All personnel re-boarded the Land Rovers and the vehicles were turned around, to drive 
back in the direction to where they had started. After approximately one kilometre, the 
vehicles were again stopped and further survey activities were carried out.  
70. After this section of survey had been completed, the teams once again boarded their 
vehicles and began to drive back further towards the main road and Omhajer. 
71. The vehicles were travelling southeast along the unsurfaced track, at a speed of 
approximately twenty-five kilometres per hour. The lead vehicle was approximately twenty-
five metres in front of the following vehicle; this estimation was taken from the [Demining 
group] commander of the second vehicle [name removed]. After driving for approximately five 
minutes, the leading vehicle drove over an anti tank mine, causing the front end of the Land 




ACTIONS TAKEN AFTER THE DETONATION 
72. After the landmine had detonated, both vehicles came to a halt. The occupants of the 
second vehicle immediately went to the aid of the first vehicle. Once the safety of all 
occupants had been ascertained, it was quickly realised that more landmines could be 
present on the area and so the two teams together began a methodical clearing of the area in 
order that they might move about sufficiently to assist in the recovery of personnel and 
equipment from the incident site. 
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73. While this was happening, a radio message was sent to UNMO team site at Omhajer, to 
request assistance. UNMO duty officer at the UNMO team site reports that HF 
communications reception was not good and the only message received was a request for an 
armoured vehicle to assist in the recovery of a [Demining group] vehicle.  
74. Duty Officer further states that he walked over to the Jordanian company at Omhajer to 
relay [Demining group]’s request for an armoured vehicle and that the Jordanian response 
was in the negative. Although no timings are shown, this version of events is supported by 
information shown in the INMARSAT and telephone log sheets produced by the UNMOs. 
(Telephone and INMARSAT log sheets are used as radio and operational logs at the Omhajer 
UNMO Team Site).  
75. The Jordanian Duty Officer on that day was Capt [name removed]. [Capt name removed] 
states that no such request was received from the UNMOs. A handwritten page was shown to 
the Board of Inquiry team, but no operations or radio log was produced by the Jordanian 
Company to show what occurred on the day in question. 
76. [Demining group] Survey Team members used metal detectors to sweep a path to the 
stricken vehicle, this was marked with plastic mine markers and all equipment and personnel 
were transferred into the remaining Land Rover. 
77. A safe path was cleared down the unsurfaced road in the intended direction of travel and 
towards Omhajer. 
 
EXTERNAL ACTIONS BY SUPPORTING AGENCIES 
Immediately after the incident, the Survey Team contacted [Demining group] Asmara and 
made a report about what had happened. At the same time they called the UNMO Team Site 
at Omhajer and requested that UNMOs arrange assistance from JORBAT Company in 
Omhajer. 
Direct radio communications between the [Demining group] Survey Team and the UNMO 
Team site were then lost and the UNMOs were unaware that [Demining group] had been 
involved in a mine incident. 
Approximately one hour after the incident, [Demining group] Project Manager went to the 
UNPK Force HQ JOC in Asmara and an arrangement was made through JORBAT 
Headquarters at Barentu for an APC and a Doctor to be despatched from the JORBAT 
Company at Omhajer to go to meet the [Demining group] Survey Team on their way back 
from the incident site. 
The APC and crew departed Omhajer accompanied by an UNMO vehicle, and patrolled the 
main road for approximately two hours, but did not meet the [Demining group] Survey Team 
and it is assumed that they missed each other due to both passing the road junction at 
different times. 
[Demining group] national staff members state that approximately fifteen minutes after the 
incident, ten or twenty EDF soldiers arrived at the scene.  
 
CONFIRMATION OF INSURANCE 
78. [Demining group] Asmara state that all of the staff members involved in this incident are 
insured by Lloyds of London in accordance with Eritrean national requirements. 
 
SUMMARY 
79. These [Demining group] Trust Survey Team personnel were travelling over an area of 
ground that they believed was not mined, within an area that was suspected as mined. The 
team was defining mined areas through the use of map, compass and GPS by visiting areas 
of suspect ground as part of a process of assessment to decide whether the area warranted 
the deployment of mine clearance teams. Mines had been found on adjacent areas. The team 
considered that the ground where the detonation occurred was an area with no obvious risk 
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because it was in use by the local community and had been cleared by the EDF demining 
Team. The [Demining group] Survey Team had information to suggest that the entire area 
was very dangerous but were reassured that the track was safe because of the EDF mine 
Clearance Team’s work on the morning of the incident. The team was tasked directly by 
[Demining group] Asmara, without coordination from UNMEE MACC. Minor injuries sustained 
by one person led to bleeding from his ears. No further significant injuries were sustained. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
80. On the day of the incident [Demining group]’s Survey Teams were carrying out 
independent minefield Survey duties. The source of tasking for surveys in the Omhajer region 
is not clear. 
81. The teams had informally and tacitly assessed the area of ground that the teams were 
working over at the time of the incident as of no obvious risk. 
82. Priority and sequence of tasking for this survey deployment in Omhajer region is unclear. 
83. Radio communications in the local area were insufficient and could have been improved. 
This could have been simply by establishing communication with a routine radio check before 
departing the UNMO team site, or an alternate means of communication established. 
84. [Demining group] survey SOP is insufficient and not accredited by UNMEE MACC. 
85. Although members of both Survey Teams are experienced and trained in first aid, there 
was no qualified or specifically appointed medic with either team. Medical care after a 
landmine incident should depend on the training of a qualified medic, not on the individual 
skills of team members. 
86. No formal plan for the evacuation of landmine casualties was prepared;, but the team 
relied on helicopter evacuation from UNMEE in the event of an accident to their team, but had 
not coordinated this locally prior to starting their survey operation. 
87. Although [Demining group] is supported by UNMEE with the use of helicopters, 
information briefings, provision of information, and administrative and general support, this 
does not provide UNMEE with any measure of influence over [Demining group] activities in 
the TSZ and [Demining group] appear to do whatever they wish, with reference to UNMEE 
only when they want support. 
88. It was not possible to confirm the type of anti tank mine involved in this incident. 
89. There is no substantive evidence of re-mining being a factor in this incident. 
Although no one was seriously injured in this incident, this was largely due to the fact that the 
personnel involved were travelling in an armoured vehicle. It is possible that more research 
and more planning, coupled with a systematic analysis and use of local information could 
have avoided this accident. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
90. Although no one was seriously injured in this incident, this was largely due to the fact that 
the personnel involved were travelling in an armoured vehicle. It is possible that more 
research and more planning, coupled with a systematic analysis and use of local information 
could have avoided this accident. 
91. Although it is accepted that the risk of travelling on the unsurfaced track was reduced by 
the deployment of EDF demining personnel on the morning of the incident, less reliance 
should be placed on the results of demining personnel who have not been trained to a 
standard compatible the UN International Mine Action Standards.  
92. Personnel deployed on minefield survey operations should not travel off known clear 
areas. 
93. When teams are deployed to carry out minefield surveys in the TSZ and adjacent areas, it 
should be as part of a planned tasking through UNMEE MACC. Tasking and coordination of 
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all mine survey operations in the TSZ and adjacent areas should be implemented in 
coordination with the UNMEE MACC.  
94. In order to ensure that all known information is made available to Survey teams, Minefield 
Surveys in the TSZ and adjacent areas should be coordinated in cooperation with the Mine 
Action Coordination Centre. Complete reliance should not be placed on single-source or 
unconfirmed information. 
95. Organisations and personnel deployed to carry out minefield surveys should work in 
accordance with their own SOPs, which should be accredited by UNMEE MACC before they 
are implemented. No further [Demining group] operations within the TSZ and adjacent areas 
will be authorised until UNMEE MACC have assessed [Demining group] SOPs as acceptable. 
96. A formal plan for casualty evacuation should be carried in every Survey vehicle. This 
should include the location and route to the nearest appropriate hospital facility. 
97. In some areas of the TSZ, it will be necessary for vehicles to travel together in pairs. This 
directive should apply to all agencies, not only mine Survey Teams. 
98. Radio communications between [Demining group] vehicles and the nearest UNMO and 
UNPK units should be improved. This could initially be achieved by simply exchanging call 
signs and frequencies. 
99. A formalised weekly work plan for operations inside the TSZ and adjacent areas should 
be provided in advance every week from [Demining group] Asmara to the UNMEE MACC. 
100. This accident could have been avoided if a system of route clearances were established 
across the TSZ and adjacent areas. It is recommended that a study be made on what options 
are available to check roads and tracks for landmine on a structured, routine basis. 
101. The unsurfaced track should be flailed and UNMEE should provide assistance to recover 
the damaged vehicle. 
 
Signed: Chief of Operations, UNMEE MAC; Chief of Information, UNMEE MAC. 
 
[Annexes are held on file.] 
Distribution: HQ UNMEE, MACC, Commissioner for Coordination with UNMEE; UNMAS, 
[Demining Group] Scotland, US Embassy Asmara, [Demining group] Asmara. 
  




Victim number: 573 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: Not recorded Gender: Male 
Status: Supervisory  
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: none Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
Minor ears 





INITIAL REPORT OF LANDMINE INCIDENT 
1.The following is the text of an e-mail sent to UNMEE MACC on 20 February at 1136hrs. 
 
From: [Demining group] 
Sent; 20 February 2001 11:36 
Subject: Tank mine strike 
 
At 10:30hrs 20/2/01 an armoured [Demining group] Land Rover struck an anti-tank mine on a 
dirt track 4 kilometre north-west of Omhajer. There were no casualties. The track had been 
checked by EDF engineers that morning, and had previously been used by [Demining group]. 
The vehicle is being recovered by the Jordanian contingent using an APC. I have tried calling 




2. The e-mail was not received at MACC and [Demining group] Asmara sent the same 
message by Fax at 13:48hrs. 
 
 
Response to complaint by the demining group involved 
[Demining group] COORDINATION AND COOPERATION WITH UNMEE MACC 
Acknowledgement is made of [Demining group] response to UNMEE MACC Board of Inquiry 
report on [Demining group]’s landmine accident in Eritrea. 
It would seem that [Demining group] continue to remain arrogant, sanctimonious and 
uncooperative. With this in mind, there seems to be little point in providing a further response, 
except to say that every point in the UNMEE MACC Board of Inquiry report remains as 
originally published. 
Draft versions of MACC reports about landmine incidents are not provided to organisations or 
individuals outside the investigation team. This system will continue. 
It is remarkable that, although [Demining group] Asmara have recently sustained an accident 
that cost a great deal of money and the potential for loss of life and limb of its own employees, 
no known actions have been taken to assist in the prevention of future such events. 
You are referred to page 2 of the Guide for the application of UN International Mine Action 
Standards. The final paragraph in Section four informs that IMAS are not SOPs and do not 
define the way in which mine action standards are to be achieved in the field. [Demining 
group] SOPs are insufficient and the UNMEE MACC recommends that [Demining group] 
address this insufficiency as a priority. 
Part of the Quality Assurance effort by any organisation should be to document procedures 
and drills, for use by managers and in training as well as for general reference throughout the 
organisation. The reference documents of an organisation are what provide its continuing 
standards and are useful to outsiders and to new arrivals within the organisation.  
It is interesting to note that in one part of [Demining group]’s response, it is stated that they 
will conform with IMAS, in another part of the document it is stated that IMAS is ‘woolly’ It 
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should be noted that IMAS is currently a draft document and not formally issued by the UN for 
use in the field or elsewhere. 
UNMEE MACC intends to investigate future landmine incidents using the same procedures 
and standards as were used last time. 
It is noted that [Demining group] Asmara continue to not report their activities within the TSZ 
and adjacent areas to UNMEE MACC on any regular basis or with any structured reporting 
format. The last report from [Demining group] to UNMEE MACC was on 16 February 2001.  
[Demining group] visits to the MACC are generally infrequent, irregular, unannounced, and 
hurried. The MACC continues to hear about [Demining group] activities on their Netherlands 
contract, their US DoS contract, deminer and EOD training and general operations on a 
second-hand basis through conversations with other individuals and agencies, or from reports 
from other organisations. The working relationship between MACC and [Demining group] is 
virtually non-existent but [Demining group] continue to make paranoid comments about their 
perception of MACC’s desire to command and control their operation. 
From a MACC perspective, [Demining group] appears to be an organisation that does not 
want to be coordinated and no further attempt will be made by UNMEE MACC to coordinate 






Land mine accident 
It was Tuesday morning when we (two experts, two interpreters, three Eritrean (EDF) 
surveyors, two local drivers and I (trainee) left Om-hajer driving two Land rover heading 
towards North west of the town. Our purpose is to make some marks on the field that we 
considered as a danger mine areas. We drove westward of the Tessenai Om-hajer road 
heading with small road and after we went four up to five kilometres the EDF surveyors told 
us to stop there for they did not survey the area beyond before i.e, it may be risk to drive. In 
that turning point ([two names removed]) take notes and measured the location and took 
photos of that area which was the Ethiopian trench in front of it full of anti personnel-mines. 
The focus point which we were 50 meters from the mines. After the experts finished their job 
we started to drive back to Om-hajer. The first car  driven  by (one of the expert) 
And with it the three EDF  and an interpreter. The second one drove by local driver and all the 
remaining members of that day. While we have driven around one kilometre back through the 
same road we had driven in the early morning, the first car blown out by land mine and 
heavily damaged its front part. [The Victim/driver] was damaged his ear especially while the 
others were Ok. Then [name removed] radioed to UN Jordanians in Om-hajer to come and 
help us but the did not come. Instead some 10-20 EDF men came and searched the area if 
some infiltrated armed men were in the place. After four hours we got out from the area and 




First, two teams of [Demining group] went to Om-hajer on Monday February 19th 2001. So 
after we checked where we staying we went to the EDF camp and talked two military 
engineers [names removed] about the trenches (old Ethiopian Points) about the safety to get 
in to them so they told us that the checked roads are Ok to drive on otherwise they are not, so 
we told them to talk us to the trenches through the safe road they agreed we made an 
appointment with them for the next morning at 7:30. So after [names removed] arrived we 
started driving. After driving for about six kilometres we got to the end of trenches and did 
some work there, on the way back through the same road at about 10:20 the vehicle I was on 
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drove over a mine. I can’t tell whether it is AT or an AP mine. After making sure that every 
one is Ok we decided to check the road our self-using the detectors and also the EDF 
engineers helped us on that one but no one else. Actually we asked the UNMOS and the 
UNMEE to help us but they were not there, we were there for four hours but they did not 
come. They told us later that they went through another road. Finally we got to the UNMOS 
on our own when they started to reason out their position. 
 
Signed: Interpreter  
  
We left Om-hajer on 20-02-2001 at 8:00 in the morning. I was forced to leave my car and 
gave to [name removed] because the deminers who were travelling with us crowded the car. I 
went to the other car. We crossed the road peacefully and did our work for one and half 
hours. And then we turned back through the same road, suddenly the accident happened to 
the first car. When the accident happened we tried to contact the UN peacekeeping force but 
nobody helps us. At last we turned back to Om-hajer with our efforts. 
 
Signed: Local driver. 
 
23-02-2001 
We departed from Asmara on 18-12-2001 and moved towards Keren. We intended to spend 
the night at Barentu but we were told that our destination is Om-hajer and it’s surrounding. 
According to our instruction we departed from Om-hajer on the 20-02-2001 at 8:30 p.m. 
[Three names removed] and myself were in the 2nd car and we were following the car that 
was being driven by [the victim] that also contained [name removed] and three other EDF 
deminers. And finally we reached our destination. At the spot after getting adequate 
information from EDF deminers we started to come back through the same road. All of a 
sudden we saw the car which was in-front and was being driven by [the victim]  was damaged 
by land mine . After this we were told by [name removed] not to come down of the car and not 
to move anywhere. After some minute we saw the people coming out safely from the car that 
was damaged by the mine and we were happy. Even though [the victim] had got minor 
injuries we were happy that he was alive. After 15 minutes EDF soldiers came to our rescue. 
It was reported to Asmara by radio that we had an accident. [The victim] also called for help to 
nearby UN posts but nobody came. Then we turned back to Om-hajer to the UN camp 






The primary cause of this incident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the group 
had taken pains to ensure that the area they were in had been checked before they drove 
there. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the 
demining group’s senior managers failed to ensure that communications were established 
and failed to provide their staff with detailed SOPs. It seems that their field staff were 
inadequately trained because they did not realise the need to have communications, medics, 
evacuation plans or SOPs. 
